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ABSTRACT 
The paradox of choice leads one to desire more options over fewer options even when 
there are negative consequences when choosing from larger arrays (choice overload). The 
paradox of choice may be shared among mammals or it could result from cultural influences 
relevant to humans. Research with monkeys and young children sheds light on the 
developmental precursors of the paradox and may highlight the human-uniqueness of this effect. 
I tested young children (41.5–66.0 months) and monkeys (tufted capuchins, rhesus macaques) to 
examine choice overload effects. Limited evidence was found that children exhibited choice 
overload when choosing among six and twelve toys but not when choosing among three toys. No 
evidence of choice overload was found for monkeys, although this may be due to methodological 
limitations. Consistent with previous literature on choice and control, monkeys also 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 Humans make countless choices each day. In the first hour after waking up, we may 
decide what to wear, what to eat, whether to go into work, the route we want to take, what we 
want to listen to on the way, and so on. Nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) also make many 
choices every day, some that are critical to their survival (e.g., who to attack, who to defend, 
where to feed, where to sleep) and some that are not (e.g., who to play with, what to investigate, 
etc.). Having choices provides us with a perception of control over our environment (Perlmuter 
& Monty, 1977), and it enhances our feelings of autonomy and self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 
1985). It is widely accepted that possessing a sense of control over one’s environment, that is, by 
having choices, is a psychological necessity for the wellbeing of humans and other animals (e.g., 
Leotti et al., 2010; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Washburn, 2015), such that we—humans and other 
animals—have evolved to desire and seek out choice and control.  
1.1 Evidence that the need for control is widespread across species 
In their review of the psychological literature on control, Leotti and colleagues (2010) 
argued that perceiving control over one’s environment is evolutionarily adaptive, because 
increased control over the environment will improve an animal’s chance of survival. For 
instance, when faced with choices, animals are likely to choose the option that provides them 
with the most favorable outcome and avoid the option that may cause harm (Leotti et al., 2010). 
Leotti and colleagues (2010) point to evidence that indicates control is needed for typical, 
healthy development: for instance, healthy individuals tend to overestimate their personal control 
in a situation as compared to depressed people, and healthy individuals will attempt to rationalize 
outcomes where they did not have control rather than concede any loss of their perceived control 
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Cannon, 1999; Lewinsohn et al., 1980; Peterson & Seligman, 1987, 
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as cited by Leotti et al., 2010). Further, the authors point to evidence that overcompensation for a 
diminished sense of control can lead to maladaptive, destructive behaviors and mood disorders 
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003; Goodie, 2005; Shapiro et al., 1996, as cited by Leotti et al., 
2010).  
To argue that control over choices is adaptive, humans and other species must experience 
positive side effects when they have increased control and, correspondingly, experience negative 
consequences when their perception of control is diminished. The psychological literature has 
demonstrated evidence to support this claim: a diverse range of animals – including flies 
(Batsching et al., 2016), pigeons (Catania, 1980; Catania & Sagvolden, 1980), rats (Voss & 
Homzie, 1970), and monkeys (Beran et al., 2007; Suzuki, 1999; Washburn, 2015; Washburn et 
al., 1991) – are sensitive to the perception of control and prefer having more choices. 
The removal of the perception of control is similarly aversive and harmful to many 
species. In their classic study on learned helplessness, Seligman and Maier (1967) demonstrated 
that dogs who were repeatedly exposed to inescapable shock later did not attempt to escape 
electric shock even when it was avoidable. This study led to an abundance of research on the 
psychological impacts of choice and lack thereof. The research that followed illustrated that 
diminished autonomy or personal control leads to decreased performance, motivation, and 
cognitive functioning, and greater likelihood of developing mood disorders and maladaptive 
behaviors (Greenberger et al., 1989; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Leotti et al., 2010; Seligman & 
Maier, 1967; Washburn et al., 1991; Winocur et al., 1987). For instance, institutionalized 
individuals, such as those in nursing homes, prisons, and hospitals, who inevitably are less able 
to exercise control over their day-to-day lives, experience reduced physical and psychological 
wellbeing and increased learned helplessness (nursing homes: Langer & Rodin, 1976; prisons: 
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Schill & Marcus, 1998; hospitals: Raps et al., 1982). Similarly, animals in captivity display 
stereotypical behaviors (repetitive, purposeless behaviors induced by stress) likely due, at least in 
part, to decreased control over their environment compared to their feral counterparts (Kurtycz, 
2015).  
Whereas diminished control has harmful effects on psychological well-being, the 
opposite is also true: increasing the perception of control greatly benefits satisfaction, 
motivation, and performance in humans and other animals (e.g., Beran et al., 2007; Greenberger 
et al., 1989; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Leotti et al., 2010; Perlmuter & Monty, 1977; Washburn et 
al., 1991; Zuckerman et al., 1978). For instance, pleasure is enhanced when rats can control their 
positive reinforcement rather than receive it passively (Faircloth, 1974), and self-controlled 
locomotion in rats caused faster healing following surgery than passive movement through an 
identical environment (Dru et al., 1975). Additionally, Washburn and colleagues (1991) found 
that rhesus monkeys’ performance on computerized tasks improved when they choose their own 
tasks compared to their performance when the same task was assigned to them, eliminating the 
opportunity for choice. Monkeys demonstrated this improved performance because they 
maintained greater motivation when they were provided with choices compared to when no 
choice was available (Washburn et al., 1991). Beran and colleagues (2007) replicated this result 
in a similar study with capuchin monkeys who were able to choose the order in which they were 
able to complete their tasks.  
Humans’ performance also appears to improve when an element of control is introduced. 
Institutionalized older people who possessed greater control over their day-to-day lives had 
greater physical and psychological well-being than those who had less control (Langer & Rodin, 
1976). In the same vein, institutionalized older people’s personal locus of control 
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(operationalized by the individuals’ ratings of their desire for control multiplied by their ratings 
of their perceived control in several areas of life; see Reid et al., 1977) predicted performance on 
cognitive tasks better than stress and psychosocial measures, where a higher perceived locus of 
control led to higher performance on a cognitive battery (Winocur et al., 1987). Other studies 
have found a similar positive correlation between perception of control and performance 
(Greenberger et al., 1989; Perlmuter & Monty, 1977), intrinsic motivation (Greenberger et al., 
1989; Perlmuter & Monty, 1977; Zuckerman et al., 1978), and satisfaction (Greenberger et al., 
1989).  
Perhaps the most compelling evidence pointing to the adaptive nature of the perception of 
control is that animals and humans choose to choose. Rats and children sometimes will choose to 
work for food rather than accepting free reward (Singh, 1970), and Perdue and colleagues (2014) 
empirically tested rhesus and capuchin monkeys’ preference for choice by providing them the 
ability to choose the order in which they completed a task or choose to receive the tasks in a 
previously established preferred order. The monkeys maintained a preference for choice, even 
when the alternative already provided a preferred task order, providing supporting evidence that 
the perception of control is inherently rewarding (Perdue et al., 2014). Finally, humans and 
capuchin monkeys will choose an option simply for the sake of not losing that option from a 
choice array (Perdue & Brown, 2018; Shin & Ariely, 2004). That is, when given a computerized 
choice array in which one icon that leads to a specific task becomes progressively smaller 
following each trial where it is not chosen (until the option disappears entirely or is restored to 
full size by selecting the option), humans and capuchin monkeys will eventually choose the 
diminishing option, even when it is not preferred, rather than losing it entirely. This indicates that 
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humans and capuchins would prefer to ‘keep their options open,’ even when some of those 
options are less preferred or provide no additional benefit (Perdue & Brown, 2018). 
It is important to note that choosing to choose requires a greater expenditure of energy 
than being assigned a task; therefore, it must be an important aspect of a choice environment  
(Leotti et al., 2010). Together with the evidence that removing an animal’s control over their 
environment leads to extensive and long-lasting psychological harm and introducing control 
prompts immediate benefits in cognitive performance, mental health, and overall well-being in a 
wide range of animal species, it is reasonable to conclude that the perception of control is not just 
a desire; rather, possessing some perception of control is a need and is a key component of the 
psychology of rats, dogs, pigeons, flies, and primates, and likely extends even more broadly 
phylogenetically. Providing choices is one way by which to give an animal control over its 
environment, which, for most species, would beget more beneficial outcomes. Therefore, it 
would follow that most animals may have evolved to always prefer having more choices – even 
when, in some cases, more choices may do more harm than good.  
1.2 Evidence for limits to the benefits of control 
Psychological research informs us that humans and other animals are prone to making 
common, systematic decision-making errors (Furlong & Santos, 2014). Though we may think 
that our choices and our preferences are our own, both humans’ and nonhuman primates’ 
(hereafter, primates) decision making can easily be manipulated through priming effects and 
social pressure (see Furlong & Santos, 2014, for a review). Evidence points to environmental 
factors that often predispose humans and primates to make certain decisions (and mistakes), at 
least when it comes to economic, numeric, or social decisions (e.g., the Prisoner’s dilemma and 
numeric discrimination, Furlong & Opfer, 2009, 2012; Furlong & Santos, 2014; inequity 
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aversion and cooperation, see Brosnan & de Waal, 2012, for a review). However, intuition may 
lead us to believe that when it comes to well-being, we would always be able to choose 
correctly—would we not always be able to choose what makes us feel best? The common 
perception is that more control, more choices, and more freedom equals more happiness. 
Mounting evidence indicates that this is a flawed assumption. 
Although in general having control is better than not having control, there are some 
notable constraints to the benefits of control. For instance, control itself is not as important as the 
perception of control. Individuals perform better when they perceive a greater amount of control 
(e.g., when they are making a decision between two equally meaningful alternatives) compared 
to less perceived but functionally equivalent control (e.g., when there is an ‘obvious choice,’ 
where one alternative is clearly better than the other; Perlmuter & Monty, 1977). Further, the 
timing of perceived control matters: individuals who chose the first three stimulus-response pairs 
in a set of 12 (and were assigned the rest of the stimulus-response pairs) memorized the pairs 
equally as well as individuals who were able to choose all 12 pairs (Perlmuter & Monty, 1977). 
In contrast, individuals who chose the final three stimulus-response pairs performed as poorly as 
those who were provided no choice (Perlmuter & Monty, 1977). Individuals who were able to 
choose pairs that were randomly distributed throughout the set of twelve learned the pairs at an 
intermediate level (Perlmuter & Monty, 1977). Collectively, this evidence indicates that having 
control over a situation (via provided choices) does not necessarily or automatically lead to 
greater performance or satisfaction. Finally, mounting evidence indicates that there may be such 
a thing as too much control, where too many choices leads to negative outcomes (choice 
overload; e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2000, 2004). 
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1.3 The paradox of choice 
Basic economic theory and common intuition lead us to believe that more choice is 
always better, and therefore an attraction to larger arrays should not be problematic. In line with 
this conception, research demonstrates that people desire more control than they have 
(Greenberger et al., 1987), and people are drawn to opportunities to choose from a higher 
number of alternatives (Bown et al., 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). For instance, shoppers are 
more likely to approach a jam tasting booth that includes 24 jams than a tasting booth that 
includes six (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), and consumers report greater enjoyment from the 
decision-making process when they chose an item out of a larger array compared to participants 
who chose from a smaller array (e.g., Haynes, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Surprisingly, 
although we tend to be initially drawn toward a higher number of alternatives, people who 
choose from a larger array of choices are often more likely to experience negative consequences 
associated with their choice (e.g., decreased satisfaction or performance) than individuals who 
chose from a smaller array (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). This phenomenon is known as the paradox 
(or tyranny) of choice (Schwartz, 2004).  
The paradox of choice has not been fully investigated in nonhuman animals or young 
children, and it is unclear whether this phenomenon is a product of sociocultural pressures and is 
unique to humans or is a byproduct of broader decision-making mechanisms and therefore likely 
to be present early in human development and in other animals. Humans’ initial attraction to 
larger arrays could be a result of cultural influences, for instance, via the Western emphasis on 
individual freedom, reliance on the internet (which has no physical limits to the number of 
options it provides), and marketing strategies that push endless product alternatives. On the other 
hand, the tendency to be attracted to a greater number of options (no matter the psychological 
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cost) may be a product of general choice mechanisms, because larger arrays are statistically more 
likely to include a preferred choice. Further, more choice grants an organism more control over 
their environment, and therefore the ability to potentially select more desirable outcomes 
(Hutchinson, 2005; Leotti et al, 2010). Broadly, the present study aims to investigate the role of 
experience and culture on the paradox of choice by exploring whether monkeys (rhesus 
macaques and tufted capuchins) and young children (ages three to five) demonstrate the 
behavioral pattern that is typical of the paradox of choice effect in adult humans: an attraction to 
choosing from larger arrays that subsequently begets greater negative affect regarding those 
choices. I predict that the paradox of choice effect is a byproduct of conserved and evolutionarily 
widespread adaptation to prefer choice and control; accordingly, I hypothesize that humans and 
monkeys will exhibit a preference for larger arrays and experience more negative outcomes as a 
result of making a choice from a larger (compared to a smaller) array. 
1.4 Consequences of choice overload: Dependent measures 
The trademark of the paradox of choice, and what makes the phenomenon paradoxical, is 
the negative experience that come along with too many choices. The negative experience 
associated with choosing from too many options is known as choice overload (or overchoice). 
Choice overload is ubiquitous in the psychological literature; evidence for choice overload was 
documented well before the development of the paradox of choice (e.g., Payne & Bettman, 1992; 
Payne et al., 1993). However, until recently (e.g., Chernev et al., 2015) there has not been a 
formal operational definition for the choice overload effect. Rather, over the history of the 
research on the topic, studies have described a wide range of consequences that occur when we 
are faced with too many choices. For instance, Perlmuter and Monty (1977) noted that with 
increased choice comes increased potential for frustration, and Schwartz (2000) described the 
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general sensation of being overwhelmed, even paralyzed, by too many options. In experiments 
that attempted to systematically measure choice overload effects, researchers have used 
subjective and objective measures. For instance, choice satisfaction, (e.g., Diehl & Poynor, 2010; 
Haynes, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), anticipatory and post-decision regret (e.g., Haynes, 
2009; Inbar et al., 2011; Sagi & Friedland, 2007) and decision confidence (e.g., Dhar & Nowlis, 
1999; Haynes, 2009) have been used as subjective measures of choice overload. On the other 
hand, choice deferral (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Chernev, 2005), switching (e.g., Chernev, 
2003; Lin & Wu, 2006), option selection (e.g., Gourville & Sourman, 2005), and assortment 
choice (e.g., Chernev & Hamilton, 2009) have been used as objective measures of choice 
overload.  
 A recent meta-analysis on choice overload effects attempted to more formally 
operationalize the choice overload construct. Chernev and colleagues (2015) demonstrated that 
the majority of these measures (satisfaction, confidence, regret, deferral, and switching) reliably 
reflect choice overload effects, and can be used interchangeably (Chernev et al., 2015). Chernev 
and colleagues (2015) conceded that the dependent variables included in their meta-analysis do 
not represent an exhaustive list. For example, Chernev et al. (2015) failed to mention 
performance measures and consequences on overall well-being that have been documented in the 
literature. Although many consequences of choice overload have been reported, below I will 
only describe the dependent variables that will be directly relevant to my study. 
1.4.1 Choice satisfaction 
Several studies have demonstrated that consumers were less satisfied with their selection 
when they chose from a larger array compared to a smaller array. For instance, in Iyengar and 
Lepper’s (2000) seminal study, participants chose either from a limited array (six options) or 
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extensive array (30 options) of chocolates. Participants in the limited-array condition expressed 
greater satisfaction with their chocolate selection than did participants in the extensive-array 
condition. These findings have been replicated in other experiments and with differently sized 
arrays. For instance, Haynes (2009) found that people reported greater satisfaction with their 
prize selection when they chose a prize from three options than people who chose from 10 
options, and Diehl and Poynor (2010) found that their participants were less satisfied with their 
selection of a computer wallpaper when they choose it from 50 alternatives compared to those 
who made a selection from 10 alternatives.  
1.4.2 Choice switching 
Choice switching describes situations in which a participant makes a selection from an 
array and then changes their mind, returns their original selection, and chooses a different option 
from the same array. Research has demonstrated that, without access to an articulated ideal point 
(a combination of features that represents their ideal option), participants were more likely to 
exchange their originally selected box of chocolates to the most popular option than were 
participants who did have an articulated ideal point (Chernev, 2003). Similarly, individuals with 
a lower ‘need for cognition’ (NFC; which, according to the authors, indicates lower cognitive 
resources and higher propensity to rely on heuristics when making decisions in larger arrays) 
were more likely to make a switch in larger varieties than in smaller varieties (Lin & Wu, 2006).  
This tells us that an increased likelihood to exchange an original selection is indicative of choice 
overload. 
1.4.3 Performance 
Increased choice overload tends to lower the quality of performance subsequent to the 
choice. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) demonstrated this in their study in which undergraduate 
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students were randomly assigned into one of two groups. All students were informed that they 
could write an essay in order to receive extra credit points, but one group was provided with 30 
essay topics, and the second group was provided with six essay topics. The results showed that 
students in the limited-choice (six option) condition received higher scores on their essays than 
did students who were in the extensive-choice (30 option) condition. Similarly, individuals who 
had to choose from more laundry detergent options with more differing attributes (i.e., bleach 
content, fabric softener content, price, etc.; Jacoby et al., 1974) or who were under time 
constraints (Payne et al., 1993) made poorer choices than those who chose from fewer 
options/attributes or who were not under time constraints. One reason this may occur is because 
as decisions become more difficult (that is, choice overload increases) people rely more heavily 
on heuristics, which leads lower quality decisions (Payne et al., 1993). 
1.5 Mechanisms of choice overload: Factors that moderate the effects of large arrays 
It is important to note that choice overload is highly context dependent. In many cases, 
more choice does lead to better outcomes (the more-is-better effect). For instance, if I am 
specifically in the mood to eat a beet salad, I will have better luck finding a beet salad – or a 
close alternative – at a restaurant that offers 100 meal options than I am at a restaurant that offers 
six. Because some studies demonstrate the more-is-better effect and others demonstrate the 
choice overload effect, some researchers speculated that choice overload is not a reliable effect 
(e.g., Scheibehenne et al., 2010). However, Chernev and colleagues (2015) argued that context 
matters; that is, assortment size, alone, is not a reliable predictor of choice overload, but other 
factors do reliably moderate the effect of assortment size on subsequent subjective states and 
behavioral outcomes (Chernev et al., 2015). Chernev and colleagues (2015) argue that the 
seemingly non-significant effect of choice overload found in Scheibehenne and colleagues’ 
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(2010) meta-analysis is a consequence of the authors’ failure to take into account theoretically-
driven and relevant moderators of choice overload.  
In response to Scheibehenne and colleagues’ (2010) meta-analysis, Chernev and 
colleagues (2015) proposed and found statistical support for their own theoretical model, which 
includes decision task difficulty, choice set complexity, preference uncertainty, and decision goal 
as moderators that influence whether a large array will lead to choice overload or the more-is 
better effect (Figure 1).  
 
Chernev and colleagues (2015) remarked that there are likely even more moderators than 
the ones they included in their model. For example, evidence has been found that individual 
differences, such as cognitive ability (Lin & Wu, 2006) or certain personality traits (i.e., 
“maximizers” who exhaust every option before making a choice compared to “satisficers” who 
settle for ‘good enough’ options; Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009; Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz, 2000; 
Schwartz et al., 2002) can influence a person’s propensity to experience choice overload. Below, 
I will only discuss in detail the specific moderators that are immediately relevant to the present 
experiment; however, it is important for the reader to remember that there are many possible 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of moderators and consequences of 
choice overload. Adapted from Chernev et al., (2015). 
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ways by which to induce the effects of choice overload when choosing options from larger 
arrays, and larger arrays, in and of themselves, do not necessarily induce choice overload.  
1.5.1 Choice set complexity: Presence of a dominant option 
The more complex a choice set is, the more likely a person is to experience choice 
overload when choosing from larger arrays. Presumably, this is because choosing from a more 
complex set requires more cognitive effort than when a simple choice can be made. One way to 
manipulate choice set complexity is through the presence of a dominant option. 
 In cases where one of the alternatives is obviously superior to the others, it becomes 
much easier to make a decision, therefore decreasing the likelihood of choice overload (Chernev, 
2006; Payne et al., 1992). For example, choosing between 20 different rings, each with a 
precious gem in its center, would be a harder decision and therefore more likely to result in 
choice overload than choosing among an array with 19 plastic rings and one diamond ring. 
Although not investigating the paradox of choice phenomenon, Perlmuter and Monty 
(1977) used a somewhat similar paradigm when investigating the importance of the perception of 
control, and they found that choosing between similarly desirable options (i.e., choosing among 
gold- and silver-plated pencils) led to a greater perception of control than choosing between 
options where there is a clear dominant option (e.g., a gold-plated pencil versus a wooden 
pencil). This provides support for the paradox of choice phenomenon: people perceive more 
control and enjoy the decision-making process more when making a more difficult decision 
(Perlmuter & Monty, 1977), but they are more likely to experience choice overload in these 
instances (Chernev, 2006; Dhar, 1997). 
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1.5.2 Preference uncertainty: Articulated ideal point 
Preference uncertainty refers to an individual’s predetermined product or attribute 
preferences (or lack thereof). When an individual is uncertain of their preferences, they are more 
likely to experience choice overload when making a selection from a larger array than are 
individuals who have clear, definite preferences (Chernev, 2003; Mogilner et al., 2008). The 
opposite is true of individuals who do possess clear predetermined preferences, who are more 
likely to defer choice and exhibit weaker preferences when choosing from a smaller array 
compared to a larger array (Chernev, 2003; Mogilner et al., 2008). These preferences can arise 
out of an individual’s prior expertise or their articulated ideal point. 
Possessing an articulated ideal point means that you have specific set of features or a 
specific item in mind that represents your ideal option. In the example I described earlier in the 
paper I indicated that, if I were in the mood to order a beet salad, I would have better luck (and 
more likely be satisfied) by going to a restaurant with a large menu over a restaurant with a small 
menu. My yearning for a beet salad is an example of an articulated ideal point: it is the 
combination of attributes that I know would most satisfy me. Even if my exact preference (i.e., 
my ideal combination of attributes) is not met, I am still more likely to find a close second that 
matches at least some of my ideal attributes – perhaps a pear salad – when I am choosing from a 
larger array. Therefore, it should follow that, if an individual has an articulated ideal preference, 
a larger array should lead to a more-is-better effect. Research supports this claim: participants 
who had an articulated ideal point (i.e., a preferred type of chocolate, or preferred attributes of 
chocolate) were less likely to switch their choice when they chose from a large array and more 
likely to switch their choice when they chose from a smaller array (Chernev, 2003). On the other 
hand, an individual who does not have an articulated ideal point should fare better from a smaller 
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selection; for instance, if I was not yearning a particular food, I should ultimately be more 
satisfied with my selection at the restaurant that provides menu choices. Research supports this 
claim as well: participants without a strong preference for chocolate type or chocolate attributes 
were more likely to switch their selection after choosing from larger arrays (Chernev, 2003). 
1.5.3 Summary 
A person’s propensity to choice overload can be influenced by a number of factors, 
including the presence of a dominant option or a person's articulated ideal point. Having to 
choose from large arrays that do not have a clear “winner” (a dominant option or a preferred 
choice) is more likely to cause choice overload because more cognitive effort is required to 
weigh the relative benefits and disadvantages of the alternatives, which increases as the array 
increases in size.   
1.6 The gap in the literature 
While extensive evidence supports the paradox of choice theory in human adults, very 
little research on this topic has been conducted with children and animals. Indeed, to my 
knowledge, no one has directly investigated the paradox of choice or choice overload in animals. 
However, Addessi and colleagues (2010) indirectly tested this question by investigating capuchin 
monkeys’ preference for variety versus monotony. In this study, capuchins chose between two 
tokens. If the variety token was chosen, monkeys could choose a food item from ten different 
options, where one option was a highly-preferred choice and the other nine were less-preferred 
choices. Alternatively, if the monotony token was chosen, monkeys could choose a food item 
from ten identical, highly-preferred options. Consistent with the human data, capuchins preferred 
to make a choice from the array that included a single preferred option (the variety option). 
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However, unlike human tendencies, the monkeys tended to choose a less-preferred food from the 
array (Addessi et al., 2010).  
Similarly, to my knowledge only one study has explored this topic with children, in 
which the researchers identified a curvilinear relationship between choice overload and age 
(Misuraca et al., 2016). Specifically, the researchers found that children (mean age of 9.8) and 
older adults (mean age of 76.6) experienced greater difficulty and less satisfaction when 
choosing from larger arrays than smaller arrays (consistent with the choice overload effect). 
However, when compared to adolescents (mean age of 16) and younger adults (mean age of 
32.2), children and older adults experienced greater satisfaction and less regret when choosing 
from larger arrays (Misuraca et al., 2016). In other words, children and older adults were less 
susceptible to choice overload effects than were teens and younger adults (Misuraca et al., 2016) 
even though they did still experience such choice overload.  
This study included a few important limitations; for instance, the dependent measure of 
satisfaction was based on children’s rankings on a Likert scale, which, the authors noted, other 
research has demonstrated is not a reliable measure of children’s feelings and opinions 
(Markopoulos et al., 2008, as cited by Misuraca et al., 2016; see also Mellor & Moore, 2013). 
Further, the authors remarked that children’s and seniors’ reports of greater satisfaction on their 
choice of cookie might have been a consequence of the documented differences between age and 
preference for sugar: older adults and children have been shown to have a stronger sweet tooth 
than adolescents and younger adults (e.g., Coldwell et al., 2009; Desor & Beauchamp, 1987; 
Walter & Soliah, 1995, as cited by Misuraca et al., 2016). 
The current state of the literature leaves much to be desired regarding our knowledge of 
the paradox of choice effect in animals and young children. An investigation of these populations 
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can shed light on the evolutionary foundations and developmental nature of the paradox of 
choice effect. Specifically, it will help answer the question of whether the paradox of choice is a 
byproduct of cultural influences or a more widespread phenomenon likely grounded in 
mechanisms of choice behavior shared across species. That is, is it a result of cultural practices 
or is it a basic feature of decision making that has led us to always desire more choices, even 
when more choices ultimately leave us feeling less happy or more overwhelmed? Importantly, 
the answer to this question will better our understanding of choice behavior and cognitive 
processes more generally. That is, this research may help us understand whether the human 
tendency to seek out and expend effort to access more choices, even when it diminishes our well-
being, is a result of cultural norms and the mindset that more choice is always better, or if we are 
biologically driven to always seek out more choice regardless of the psychological cost.  
Further, this research could have important practical implications, especially for humans 
and other animals whose choice arrays are provided by others. For instance, institutionalized 
individuals and captive animals are provided only a subset of options for food and activities each 
day compared to their non-institutionalized counterparts. Data collected from this study may 
point to what number of alternatives may optimize psychological well-being when individuals 
are faced with a difficult decision, or, at least, at what point providing more options may do more 
harm than good. 
1.7 The present study 
As previously mentioned, the tendency to be attracted to a greater number of options may 
be a product of cultural influence. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) named examples such as 
enterprises that market endless varieties of ice creams and fast food restaurants that encourage us 
to “have it your way.” Fasolo and colleagues (2007) noted that, with the advancement of the 
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internet, people today have virtually limitless choices. These factors, especially coupled with the 
Western value of ever greater personal freedom, may lead us to be attracted to a greater number 
of options, even when a greater number of options may ultimately reduce our well-being. Indeed, 
Schwartz (2000) pointed out that, because of these advances, people today have more choice 
than ever before. That being said, if more choice inherently evokes more happiness, it would 
follow that we should see greatly reduced rates of depression compared to past decades 
(Schwartz, 2000). On the contrary, depression rates, like our number of choices, are higher than 
ever, occurring at as much as 10 times the rate than in the previous 100 years (e.g., Klerman et 
al., 1985; Robins et al., 1984, as cited by Schwartz, 2000). 
 An alternative explanation for our attraction to a greater number of choices is the 
adaptive benefit that comes along with more control over the environment. That is, we may be 
instinctually driven to seek out more choices (no matter the psychological cost), because more 
options means a better chance of finding a preferred choice (e.g., a ripe fruit or a healthy mate) 
and more control over our environment (e.g., the ability to avoid a threatening situation). 
Decades of research has demonstrated that humans and animals are similarly sensitive to the 
perception of control (e.g., Perlmuter & Monty, 1977; Seligman & Maier, 1967; Washburn et al., 
1991) and rely on similar cognitive processes and heuristics when it comes to making decisions 
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2012; Furlong & Santos, 2014). Consequently, I hypothesize that the 
paradox of choice is a shared phenomenon across species due to shared mechanisms underlying 
choice behavior, and therefore will be present early in human development and in other animals.  
 The present study also addressed limitations found in other studies. For instance, our 
measures were primarily behavioral (i.e., latency to make a choice, switching likelihood, dropout 
rates, performance) and therefore were not subject to the disadvantages associated with self-
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report data that are often used in other studies. Switching likelihood and performance have been 
used as dependent measures of choice overload in previous literature, and so those are valuable 
measures here. I proposed that longer latency to make a choice (above and beyond proportional 
scanning time) would be indicative of increased cognitive effort; in other words, taking longer to 
choose would indicate greater decision difficulty. I also used a modified Likert scale to collect 
children’s satisfaction ratings with the toys they choose, with smiley faces that increased in size 
(Appendix C). However, past research has demonstrated that children’s responses on Likert 
scales are not reliable measurements of their feelings and moods (Mellor & Moore, 2013); 
therefore, the satisfaction data acted as a potential secondary, supporting analysis to our other 
collected measurements. 
In line with Chernev and colleagues’ (2015) meta-analysis on the moderators of choice 
overload, I attempted to induce potential choice overload effects by eliminating options that 
would be considered objectively or subjectively dominant (i.e., options that include higher 
quality attributes or that closely matched the participants’ previously established preferences). 
This was important because previous research has demonstrated that individuals are more likely 
to experience choice overload at larger arrays when those arrays do not include a clearly superior 
alternative or an alternative that matches the participant’s ideal point (Chernev, 2003, 2006). 
 Finally, I used three, six, and nine options (for monkeys) or three, six, and 12 options (for 
children) in the limited-choice, intermediate-choice, and extensive-choice conditions, 
respectively. In human (adult) studies, the most commonly utilized number of alternatives is 16-
24 for the extensive-choice condition (Chernev et al., 2015), and this range falls outside of what 
is considered the typical range of items that adult humans can maintain in their working memory 
(Miller, 1956). However, it is important to note that paradox of choice effects have been found at 
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relatively smaller arrays (e.g., three versus ten; Haynes, 2009). In this study, I used relatively 
smaller arrays (three, six, and nine or 12) for the practicality of designing the computer program 
on which the monkeys will be tested. Additionally, nine (for the monkeys) and 12 (for the 
children) falls outside the range of what is easily and immediately countable.   
Six is the most commonly used number of alternatives for the limited-choice condition 
(Chernev et al., 2015), and it falls into range which is considered manageable for adult working 
memory (i.e., the “seven plus or minus two” rule; Miller, 1956). Additionally, Reed and 
colleagues (2011) found that six was the number most often associated with individuals’ “break-
point” – that is, the number at which participants switched to preferring fewer options rather than 
more. Because six is a widely used and theoretically important number of alternatives, I included 
it as an option in the present study. However, because young children (Alloway et al., 2006; 
Gathercole et al., 2004) and primates have more limited working memory capacity and cognitive 
control than that of adult humans, I also included a smaller range of options (three) as the 
limited-choice condition.  
 I hypothesized that monkeys (tufted capuchins and rhesus macaques) and young children 
(ages three to five) would exhibit the paradox of choice effect, such that (a) they would prefer to 
choose from a larger array over a smaller or intermediate array and (b) they would experience 
choice overload when choosing from the larger array but not the small or intermediate array. In 
order to induce choice overload at larger arrays, all of the alternatives in the arrays were made to 
be roughly equally preferable, thereby eliminating any objectively dominant options as well as 
any alternatives that may have matched any individual’s ideal point. Choice overload was 
measured by evaluating children and monkeys’ propensity to switch and latency to choose, 
children’s satisfaction ratings, and monkeys’ task performance. Because this was the first time 
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the paradox of choice was explored in very young children and nonhuman primates, I did not 
make any a priori predictions about species or age differences – rather, I expected there to be a 
wide range of individual differences within each species and age.  
2 EXPERIMENT 1 
The goal of Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b was to determine whether children (three 
to five years old) exhibited a paradox of choice effect. I hypothesized that children would 
experience the paradox of choice, such that (a) they would prefer to choose from a larger array 
over a small or intermediate array and (b) they would experience choice overload when choosing 
from the larger array and not from the small and intermediate array. In order to diminish prior 
preference effects, before Experiments 1a and 1b were conducted, I first gathered information on 
each child’s favorite color and animal, and I used that information to remove prize options from 
the experimental arrays that may have closely matched the child’s ideal point. In Experiment 1a, 
children were assigned to each of three choice conditions (limited choice (LC): three options; 
intermediate choice (IC): six options; extensive choice (EC): 12 options) in random order. The 
children were asked to choose a toy from the array of options presented to them, and researchers 
measured whether each child chose to exchange their first choice after a 60 second delay 
(Appendix A). In Experiment 1b, children were to first choose among three differently sized 
buckets (small, representing a limited-choice option; medium, representing an intermediate-
choice option; and large, representing an extensive-choice option). The child would have to 
choose a bucket without seeing the toys inside; however, the experimenter would explain the 
child how many toys were in each bucket, and that they would only get to choose one toy from 
whatever bucket they chose. After choosing a bucket, they would then be allowed to select one 
toy from the bucket of their choice. I hoped to utilize the data from Experiment 1b in order to 
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determine whether children would exhibit the typical preference-for-more effect by 
demonstrating a strong tendency to choose the extensive-choice bucket. However, due to school 
closures amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, data collection was interrupted: Experiment 1a 
concluded prematurely and Experiment 1b was not carried out. 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 41 preschool children (ages 41.5 – 66.0 months), recruited from three 
daycares in the Atlanta area. All procedures were approved by Georgia State University’s 
Institutional Review Board. Parents provided written consent for their child to be in the study, 
and verbal assent was attained from each child on the day of testing.  
2.2 General procedure 
All testing was carried out in the children’s daycare centers, during their daily hour of 
free play. A researcher asked the child if they would like to come do their research work for the 
day, and, with their assent, the child was taken out of the classroom and brought to a private 
room with the researcher(s). The child first completed an unrelated task, either on the computer 
or manually, that took anywhere from one minute to thirty minutes. Upon completing that task, 
the child was then able to pick out a “prize” (toy) for doing research for the day. The children 
were familiar with this procedure; any time children were asked to come back and do research, 
they received a prize at the end of the session. The current experiments took place during this 
prize selection phase. The children were able to choose a prize out of some array (consisting of 
3, 6, or 12 items) of toys that differed on only a few dimensions (i.e., an array of toy vehicles, 
plastic animals, or balls).  
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2.3 Experiment 1a: Investigating choice overload in children 
The goal for this experiment was to determine whether children, like adults, exhibited 
increased choice overload when choosing from larger assortments when no dominant option/ 
predetermined preference was available. The independent variable for this experiment was the 
assigned choice condition: limited choice (three options; LC), intermediate-choice (six options, 
IC) and extensive-choice (12 options; EC) and the dependent variables were the child’s decision 
to exchange or keep their first choice, their reported satisfaction with their decision, and their 
latency to make an initial choice. Children were assigned to the conditions in pseudo-random 
order. It was planned that every child would experience each condition twice, for a total of six 
sessions. Because testing was cut short, I was not able to test 20 of the 41 children all six times; 
however, every child experienced each condition at least once. Data from all children were 
analyzed, including the children who completed fewer than six trials. I hypothesized that 
children would exhibit greater choice overload (i.e., increased switching, decreased satisfaction, 
and longer latency to choose) when exposed to the EC condition compared to the IC or LC 
conditions.  
2.3.1 Controlling for prior preferences or dominant alternatives 
Before testing began, the experimenters asked each child to indicate their two favorite 
colors and animals as well as their favorite toy (Appendix B). We then removed from each 
child’s experimental array any prizes that we felt fell in their “favorites” categories based on 
these responses. Because this experiment was conducted over the course of a few months and 
children’s preferences may have changed during that time, this survey was repeated after the 
third trial, and their future prize arrays were adjusted according to their newly recorded 
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preferences. We also removed the specific toys that a child chose in any given trial from arrays 
in future trials. 
Each array included only one toy type (i.e., toy vehicles, plastic animals, or balls) in order 
to diminish the number of dimensions on which the toys differed. This avoided a situation in 
which one item possessed a quality that made it more appealing than all others to a given child. 
This is also why we discussed with each child their preferences before Trial 1 and after Trial 3, 
and this is the means by which we hoped to eliminate options that were clearly dominant or 
corresponded to a child’s ideal point. 
2.3.2 Procedure 
Each child was pseudo-randomly assigned to the choice conditions (LC, IC, and EC), and 
underwent between three and six testing sessions, based on the data we were able to collect 
before testing was discontinued. After completing a different, unrelated task, researchers told the 
child they could pick out a toy from a (predetermined) array. The child was presented with three, 
six, or 12 similar toy options (i.e., toy vehicles, plastic animals, or balls), according to what 
condition they are assigned for that testing session. Each child only chose from one toy type 
throughout the duration of the experiment, and that toy type was randomly assigned to each child 
based on available toys. Again, these were all highly salient and preferred toys for these children 
but not the most preferred. Researchers informed the child that they could choose one prize from 
the array to keep and take home. The researchers instructed the child that they could look at the 
array for as long as they wanted before selecting the prize they would ultimately take home, but, 
as soon as they touched a toy, that would be their selection for the day (Appendix A). 
Researchers timed how long the child visually investigated the toy options before making a 
selection.  
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     25 
 
As soon as a toy was touched, researchers coded the touched toy as the child’s first 
choice selection. Next, the researchers told the child that the researchers had to “do some 
paperwork” before they could take the child back to class, and the researchers encouraged the 
child to play with their new toy while waiting (Appendix A). During this time, the other toys 
were all removed from view. The child was then given 60 seconds to play with and manipulate 
the toy of their choice while researchers appeared to be otherwise preoccupied.  
When 60 seconds expired, researchers then gave the child the opportunity to exchange 
their toy (Appendix A). If the child chose to exchange their toy, the researchers placed the first-
picked-toy back into the array, which was then presented a second time, and provided the child 
with the same instructions as before: the child could look at the array for as long as they liked, 
but as soon as they touched a toy, that toy would be the one they took home.  
As soon as the final selection was made, either after the child refused the opportunity to 
exchange or selected a second toy, the researcher then asked the child to rate their satisfaction 
with their selected toy (Appendix A). Researchers presented the child with five progressively 
larger smiley faces (Appendix C) and explained to the child that they should think of the size of 
the smiley face as representing how happy they were with their selection (Appendix A). They 
then asked the child to rate their satisfaction by pointing to the smiley face that represented their 
happiness, and their response was recorded (1 = smallest smiley, 5 = largest smiley; Appendix 
C).  After the satisfaction-rating phase, the trial was complete, and the child was taken back to 
the classroom with their selected toy. In three trials, researchers failed to collect satisfaction 
ratings from a child; those trials were excluded from satisfaction rating analyses. 
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3 EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS 
To measure possible effects of choice overload in children, I measured children’s latency 
to choose a toy, their propensity to switch their original selection, and their ultimate satisfaction 
rating in each choice condition (LC = three toys, IC = six toys, EC = 12 toys). Data were 
analyzed in R studio. Testing was cut short due to the COVID-19 pandemic and half of all 
participants (n = 20) did not complete all six testing sessions. Since non-parametric tests such as 
the Friedman’s test cannot accommodate blank cells, general linear mixed effects models were 
used to analyze the data so that all trials could be included in analyses.  
Overall, the mean latencies to choose a toy in the LC, IC, and EC conditions were 16.60 
seconds, 17.75 seconds and 25.19 seconds, respectively. I conducted a general linear mixed 
effects model of the effect of condition on latency to choose a toy. In this model, observations 
were nested within each child, and the main goal was to determine whether there was a 
significant difference in latency to choose a toy as a function of choice condition. To help control 
for age and trial-order effects, age and trial number were included as covariates. The model 
indicated that children took significantly longer to make a selection in the EC condition 
compared to the LC condition, but there was a not a significant difference in the time it took 
children to make a toy selection between the LC and IC conditions (Table 1).  
Table 1. Relative difference in latency to choose a toy as a function of choice condition. 
Condition Estimate t-value p-value  
LC Ref    
IC 1.56 0.54 0.593  
EC 9.08 3.15 0.002 ** 
Age 0.16 0.64 0.530  
Trial -0.06 -0.08 0.933  
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This result aligned with my hypothesis that children would take longer to choose a toy 
when there were more options; however, because this latency was not disproportionately longer 
than that of the other conditions (that is, although the EC condition had two or four times as 
many choices as the LC and IC conditions, respectively, it did not take more than two or four 
times the amount of time to make a decision), this result is likely attributable to the scanning 
time necessary to visually inspect larger arrays. However, it is interesting to note that when these 
latencies are plotted as a function of set size, it appears that the relationship is not linear, as one 
would expect if scanning time were the only cause increased latency (Figure 2). In this study, I 
cannot rule out that this is simply a result of increased scanning time, but future studies could 
investigate further the relationship between latency to choose and choice set size.   
 
I also analyzed children’s propensity to switch their toy in each of the three conditions. 
Overall, children chose to switch their toy 49% of the time when they were in the LC condition, 
82% of the time when they were in the IC condition, and 85% of the time when they were in the 
Figure 2. Latency to make a choice as a function of choice set size. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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EC condition. A Chi-square test assessing differences in switching by choice condition showed 
no significant differences in switching in each condition (X2(2) = 3.05, p = .218); however, the 
summary tables showed that children switched more in the IC and EC conditions compared with 
the LC condition (Table 2). 





Raw count (residuals) 
Yes 
Raw count (residuals) 
LC 45 (0.93) 22 (-1.10) 
IC 39 (-0.40) 32 (0.47) 
EC 40 (-0.50) 34 (0.60) 
 
I then analyzed these switching data further using a generalized linear mixed model, 
including age and trial as covariates. The results indicated that children demonstrated nearly 
twice the odds of switching in the IC condition than the LC condition after adjusting for age and 
trial (Table 3). Similarly, there were twice the odds that children would switch in the EC 
condition than the LC condition children (Table 3). These results did not reach significance at an 
alpha level of p <.05. However, given that we had to cut short the number of trials collected and 
considering the large effect size found here, these results provide promising evidence for our 
hypothesis.  
Table 3. Adjusted odds ratio of children’s toy switching based on choice condition.  
Condition aOR 95% CI p-value 
LC Ref 
  
IC 1.92 0.90 - 4.12 .093 
EC 2.00 0.94 - 4.26 .073 
Age 0.97 0.91 - 1.03 .255 
Trial 0.91 0.75 – 1.10 .331 
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Table 4 provides an overview of the correlational relationships between the variables 
described thus far, as well as children’s satisfaction rating which I have yet to discuss. There is a 
small, positive relationship (p = .004) between the number of options provided and children’s 
latency to make a choice. There is no correlation between any other variables. This table 
previews the lack of relationship between satisfaction rating and all other variables of interest in 
this study, suggesting that it was not a reliable measure of choice overload.  
Table 4. Correlation matrix demonstrating relationship between number of options and children’s 
satisfaction score, latency to choose, and switching likelihood.  








No. of options 1.00    
Satisfaction Score -0.04 1.00   
Latency to Choose 0.20 -0.02 1.00  
Switching 
Likelihood 
0.09 0.03 -0.01 1.00 
 
To explore the effects of choice condition on satisfaction rating, I conducted a general 
linear mixed effects model of the effect of condition on rating, controlling for age and trial. The 
goal was to determine whether there was a significant difference in satisfaction rating as a 
function of choice condition. At the end of each trial, children could rate their satisfaction with 
their chosen toy on a scale of 1-5 based on progressively larger smiley faces. The model 
indicated that children tended to have lower satisfaction scores in the EC condition (M = 4.58) 
compared to the LC condition (M = 4.77), but the effect was not significant (Table 5). Children 
in the IC condition also reported lower satisfaction ratings (M = 4.35) than the LC condition, and 
this difference was found to be significant (Table 5). These results somewhat align with my 
hypotheses, as children did report lower satisfaction scores when choosing from larger arrays; 
however, I predicted that children would have the greatest dissatisfaction when choosing from 
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the EC, which was not the result found here. Furthermore, given the previous research indicating 
the unreliable nature of measuring children’s happiness with Likert scales (which we saw 
evidence of in our own study; Mellor & Moore, 2013), I would hesitate to draw any conclusions 
about the implications of these data. 
Table 5. Relative difference in children’s satisfaction rating as a function of choice condition. 
Condition Estimate t-value p-value 
LC Ref   
IC   -0.44 -2.31 .022 * 
EC -0.20 -1.05 .294 
Age 0.01 0.70 .488 
Trial 0.04 0.77 .441 
 
4 EXPERIMENT 2 
The goal for these experiments was to determine whether and to what degree nonhuman 
primates experienced the paradox of choice. In Experiment 2a, monkeys were pseudo-randomly 
assigned to each of the three conditions (LC = three task options, IC = six task options, or EC = 
nine task options). Data were collected on proportion of task switching, latency to choose a task, 
latency to complete a task (“task performance”), and dropout behaviors for each testing session. 
In Experiment 2b, I measured the number of times monkeys choose each condition (LC, IC, or 
EC) to assess whether monkeys prefer to choose from larger arrays over smaller arrays. 
4.1 Subjects 
Included in the study were 14 socially-housed capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella; 10 
females; aged 8 to 24 years) and five male macaques (Macaca mulatta; aged 17 to 27 years) that 
were singly housed but had regular social contact with compatible conspecifics. Five of these 
capuchins (3 females; aged 10 to 22) and one macaque (age 21) either did not participate 
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regularly or completed very few trials on any given day and therefore were excluded from the 
study. All subjects were housed at Georgia State University’s Language Research Center (LRC) 
and had extensive experience working on the computer testing systems (LRC-CTS) and with the 
SELECT task paradigm. The monkeys were not food or water deprived and engagement with the 
LRC-CTS was voluntary for each individual. All procedures conformed to LRC Standard 
Operating Procedures and were approved by the GSU Animal Care and Use Committee.  
4.2 Apparatus 
Monkeys were tested on the Language Research Center’s Computer Testing Systems 
(LRC-CTS; Rumbaugh et al., 1989). Monkeys observed a 17-inch computer monitor through 
clear face-plates, and monkeys manipulated a joystick that was mounted on the face-plate using 
their hand. A pellet-dispenser was also attached to the face-plate, and pellets were automatically 
dispensed through a tube to an opening in the face-plate when the monkeys correctly completed 
a trial. 
4.3 Tasks 
In the present experiments, monkeys engaged in variations of computerized psychomotor 
tasks.  Two of these -- CHASE and MAZE -- have been used extensively in past experiments 
(Rumbaugh et al., 1989; Washburn et al., 1989, 1990; Washburn, 1992) and all monkeys in the 
present study had previous experience with these tasks or closely related variations. A third task 
used in this experiment was named DEFLECT. Although the monkeys were not familiar with 
DEFLECT, the task was very similar to others to which the monkeys had been exposed 
(including CHASE and MAZE), as it was a psychomotor task that required directing the cursor 
(by manipulating the joystick) toward a target on a screen. Monkeys first selected a task to 
perform, and then completed one trial of that task. Each trial of a task ended as soon as the goal 
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was completed and a pellet was awarded (i.e., there is no way to “fail” any of the tasks). The 
screen then reset to the choice screen and monkeys were able to select their next task. This 
continued until the end of the trial block. In cases where monkeys were unmotivated to engage in 
the study, we increased their pellet reward for each completed task trial until they demonstrated 
willingness to complete the tasks or we excluded them from further study.  
Each of these tasks could be carefully manipulated by the program to control how 
difficult they would be to complete. Each task was selected from an initial screen that gave the 
monkey an option of which task to complete. I describe that SELECT phase to each trial next, 
and then I describe the individual tasks and how the relative difficulties were set for each task for 
each monkey. 
SELECT Screen: Like the original SELECT experiment (Washburn et al., 1991), the 
SELECT screen in this experiment was comprised of a set of arbitrary icons, each of which led, 
when selected, to a specific task. The monkeys could select these icons by manipulating their 
joystick to control an onscreen cursor. Navigating the cursor to a specific icon initiated the task 
that corresponded to that specific icon. In this experiment, the SELECT screen changed 
according to the choice condition the monkey was in: in the LC condition, the SELECT screen 
only included three task icons; in the IC condition, the SELECT screen included six task icons in 
the EC condition, the SELECT screen included nine task icons from which the monkeys could 
choose (Figure 3). 
 
  




CHASE: In this task, the monkeys controlled a cursor onscreen and moved in 
continuously until it made contact with a moving target onscreen. As long as the cursor was 
moving, the target was also moving across the screen (the target moved in a saw-tooth pattern 
and deflected off of the screen borders so that it gave the impression of bouncing off the walls). 
The speed at which the target and the cursor moved vary with the difficulty level of the task and 
with each monkey’s preset levels suited to their equivalence criteria (see Section 4.4). When the 
cursor was stationary (that is, the monkeys were not manipulating the joystick), the target was 
also stationary. As soon as the cursor contacted the target, the monkey received a reward.  
MAZE: In this task, the monkeys navigated a simple barrier maze by moving the cursor 
around graphic “blockades” in order to reach a target. The target was visible on the screen at all 
times (it appeared as a blue square somewhere within the maze), and it remained stationary while 
the monkey completed the maze. A pellet was awarded as soon as the monkey’s cursor made 
contact with the target. The mazes consisted of either one, two, or three blockades, and the target 
and cursor could appear in one of nine different positions on the screen. The number of 
Figure 3. SELECT screen(s). (a) represents the SELECT screen in the LC 
condition. (b) represents the SELECT screen in the IC condition. (c) represents the 
SELECT screen in the EC condition. 
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blockades and the positions in which the target and cursor could appear were adjusted according 
to the difficulty level of the task.  
 DEFLECT: In this task, the cursor began in the middle of the screen, and a colored oval 
appeared in one of the four cardinal directions around the cursor. The monkey then had to direct 
their joystick in the direction of the oval. If moved in the correct direction, the cursor would 
jump immediately to the oval, the oval would disappear, and the cursor would return to the 
center of the screen. Another oval would then appear in another direction, and so on, until the 
monkeys hit a certain, predetermined number of ovals. The number of required ovals varied by 
the difficulty level of the task. 
 Prior to completing the formal tests of Experiment 2a and 2b, monkeys worked on these 
tasks to establish approximate equivalence of task preference (see Section 4.4). They then moved 
to the test phases. Even with this effort, there was still a concern that strong task biases might 
emerge over time. In an attempt to ensure that the choice condition and task decisions the 
monkeys made were meaningful (that is, that they did not fall into a rhythm of selecting the same 
icon, for example), monkeys only completed 30 testing trials in a given day before being put on a 
different task for the remainder of the day. Each monkey completed five testing sessions in each 
condition (LC, IC, and EC) for a total of 450 trials across 15 days of data collection. In 
Experiment 2b, monkeys completed four testing sessions (150 trials each) in which they were 
able to choose their condition (LC, IC, or EC), for a total of 600 trials per monkey in this 
experiment. 
4.4 Controlling for prior preferences or dominant alternative 
Each task (CHASE, DEFLECT, and MAZE) was represented equally across the choice 
conditions that were used for the SELECT phase of each trial. That is, the LC condition had one 
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CHASE icon in the choice set, one DEFLECT icon, and one MAZE icon. The IC condition had 
two identical icons for each those three tasks (totaling six options), and the EC condition had 
three identical icons for each task (totaling nine options; Figure 3). Because only three tasks were 
used in this experiment, but two of the choice conditions (IC and EC) required more than three 
alternatives, it was necessary to include variation within the tasks themselves. If there was not 
this intra-task variation, monkeys would only ever have three meaningful options, no matter the 
choice condition they were in: a particular version of MAZE, a particular version of CHASE, 
and a particular version of DEFLECT1.  
At the same time that I wished to create this intra-task variation in order to provide the 
monkeys with more meaningful alternatives, I also wanted to prevent the monkeys from 
establishing a strong preference for one of the task icons over the others. Should the monkeys 
demonstrate a strong preference for a particular task (as they did in the original SELECT 
experiment, for example, Washburn et al., 1991), there would then be a clearly dominant option, 
which would erase any effects of choice overload at larger arrays. Therefore, I created 
approximately equivalently-preferred tasks by titrating the parameters of each difficulty level 
and the proportions at which each difficulty level would occur for each task. Additionally, I 
ensured that the icons for each task did not provide any indication of what level of difficulty the 
chosen task would ultimately be set. The difficulty level of the task was randomly generated 
based on a set of predetermined proportions (that is, the proportion that easy, medium, and 
difficult versions of the task would appear) after the icon was chosen. Therefore, anytime a 
 
1 In the EC condition, where there would be three icons representing each task for a total of nine icons (see 
Figure 3), without variation within the tasks, this situation would be analogous to a child choosing among an array of 
nine toys in which three of the options were the exact same ball, three of the options were the exact same plastic 
animal, and three of the options were the exact same toy car. In that situation, the child is essentially choosing 
between the ball, the animal, and the car, and not among nine different options. For this reason, I introduced varying 
difficulty levels (easy, medium, and hard) within each task.  
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monkey chose the MAZE icon, for instance, they could not know whether they were about to 
play the easy, medium, or hard version of the MAZE task.  
 The difficulty levels were adjusted for each monkey by increasing or decreasing cursor 
speed (CHASE, MAZE), increasing or decreasing target size (CHASE), increasing or decreasing 
the number of blockades and adjusting the positions of the target and cursor to require more or 
less maneuvering around the blockades (MAZE), and increasing the number of deflections 
required to earn a pellet (DEFLECT). After the icon was chosen, the difficulty level of the task 
was randomly generated based on a set of predetermined proportions (that is, the proportion that 
easy, medium, and difficult versions of the task would appear) which differed for each individual 
monkey based on which parameters led them to reach equivalence between tasks. 
These customized parameters were created for each monkey after conducting several 
weeks of preliminary testing during which, at the end of each testing session, I analyzed the rate 
at which each monkey chose each task and manually adjusted the parameters of each task, 
making the more preferred task harder and the less preferred task easier. Also, during this time, I 
adjusted the relative rate at which the difficulty levels occurred, making harder versions of the 
more preferred task occur more often and easier versions of the less preferred task occur more 
often. These manual adjustments were made to ensure that monkeys would reach an equivalence 
point (i.e., no task chosen at >20% more or less than any other task). After six weeks of this 
preliminary testing and manual adjustments, I gained a better understanding of the difficulty-
level parameters that were appropriate for each monkey, but monkeys were not consistently 
meeting the equivalence criterion more than one or two days in a row. Therefore, the program 
was modified to self-titrate the proportions that the difficulty level of each task would appear for 
Experiment 2a (described in more detail below). The program did not further titrate the 
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difficulty-level settings, such as cursor speed or number of deflections; these parameters were 
individually set for each monkey based on the data collected in the previous six weeks and 
remained constant for the remainder of the experiment, unless manually adjusted by the 
experimenter when deemed necessary. When the monkey progressed to Experiment 2b, the latest 
parameters set in Experiment 2a were utilized as the parameters throughout the course of 
Experiment 2b (i.e., the program did not continue to titrate proportion of difficulty level of task). 
4.5 Experiment 2a: Investigating choice overload in monkeys 
The goal for this experiment was to determine whether monkeys demonstrated choice 
overload when exposed to larger arrays compared to small and intermediate arrays. The 
independent variable was choice condition (LC, IC, EC). The dependent variables of this 
experiment included task switching, dropout rate, task performance (operationalized by latency 
to complete the task), and the latency to choose a task. Monkeys completed 30 test trials on each 
test day for 5 days in each condition, or a total of 450 trials across 15 testing days. I hypothesized 
that monkeys would demonstrate choice overload (greater rates of task switching and dropouts, 
lower task performance, and longer latency to choose) in the EC condition compared to the LC 
and IC conditions. 
4.5.1 Design 
Each day, monkeys had to reestablish their equivalent preference point between tasks by 
progressing through at least one exposure session. The exposure session began with six forced 
trials, two forced trials of each task type (Figure 4) and was followed by 30 exposure trials. 
These exposure trials looked identical to an LC test condition: there were three task icons on the 
screen from which monkeys could choose (Figure 3). After choosing and completing the task (by 
earning a pellet reward), the program returned to the three-choice screen, and the monkey could 
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make another selection. If, at the end of the 30 trials, any task was chosen 20-100% less often 
than another task, the program automatically increased the likelihood the easy version of that 
task would appear by 20% and decreased the likelihood of the medium and hard versions by 10% 
each. Likewise, if any task was chosen 20-100% more often than another task at the end of the 
30 trials, the program automatically increased the likelihood the hard version of that task would 
appear by 20% and decreased the likelihood the medium and easy versions by 10% each. In 
either of those cases, the program began a new training session, commencing with six new 
forced trials. If all tasks were chosen at approximate equivalence (no task was chosen more than 
20% more frequently than another task), the program would progress into the testing phase. 
The testing phase consisted of 30 trials (no forced trials) in one of the choice conditions 
(LC = three task icons; IC = six task icons; EC = nine task icons; Figure 3). The task icons could 
Figure 4. Forced trials. (a) Forced CHASE selection screen. (b) CHASE task: cursor must 
chase moving target until contact is made. (c) Forced DEFLECT selection screen. (d) 
DEFLECT task: cursor must come into contact with (stationary) ovals. Ovals will appear in 
any of the four cardinal directions around the cursor. (e) Forced MAZE selection screen. (f) 
MAZE task: cursor must be navigated around blockades to reach the target. 
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appear in any of nine different positions around the perimeter of the screen. In the EC condition, 
each of the nine positions was filled with a task icon, and the location of each icon was randomly 
generated. In the LC and IC conditions, the program randomly generated three or six icons 
(respectively) into the nine positions. 
Monkeys were pseudo-randomly assigned to the three conditions so that in each block, 
each condition was presented once. At the end of the 30 testing trials, the program ended and the 
monkey would begin a different, unrelated task until the end of the day. On any given day, 
monkeys only completed one of the choice conditions in the testing phase. Across the entirety of 
the experiment, monkeys performed each of the choice conditions five times.   
4.5.2 Dependent measures: Task switching 
For every testing session, monkeys had 30 opportunities to select a task and 29 
opportunities to switch. Task switching was measured as the proportion of times monkeys 
choose the same task or a different task across consecutive trials (e.g., Trial 1 to Trial 2, Trial 2 
to Trial 3, etc.).   
4.5.3 Dependent measures: Latency to make a task choice 
Latency to make a choice was measured as the amount of time (in ms) that passed after 
the task options appear on the screen and before the monkey selected a task from the SELECT 
array.  
4.5.4 Dependent measures: Latency to complete a task (task performance) 
Because the tasks were designed so that they were impossible to fail, task performance 
was measured as the amount of time (in ms) that it took the monkey to complete the task. The 
timer started after the task appeared and ended when a pellet was awarded. 
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4.5.5 Dependent measures: Dropouts 
If, after initiating a trial by selecting a task icon, the monkey did not engage in the task 
(that is, they did not manipulate their joystick in any way) for 60 seconds, the trial was aborted 
(“dropout”) and the program returned to the choice selection screen. No pellets were awarded. 
This dropout counted as a trial toward the session total. 
4.6 Experiment 2b: Determining condition preference in monkeys 
The goal for this experiment was to determine from what condition (LC, IC, EC) 
monkeys preferred to choose a task. The dependent variable was the proportion of trials in which 
each of the conditions was selected (out of 600 trials). I hypothesized that, like humans, rhesus 
macaques and capuchin monkeys would prefer the EC condition. 
4.6.1 Design 
 Rather than the start screen appearing as the SELECT array of potential task icons (i.e., 
CHASE, MAZE, DEFLECT), in Experiment 2a, monkeys began the experiment with an array of 
choice condition icons (Figure 5). Each icon represented one of the choice array sizes: LC, IC, or 
EC. As in Experiment 2a, these icons could appear in any of the nine positions of the screen, and 
the program randomly generated the position of each icon at the beginning of each new trial. 
Depending on the condition icon chosen, the monkey was then led to the corresponding task 
selection screen which was identical to the SELECT phase of trials in Experiment 2a. In this 
experiment, monkeys essentially encountered two SELECT screens in each trial. First, monkeys 
encountered a SELECT screen in which they chose their choice conditions, LC, IC, or EC. On 
this screen, monkeys chose between three arbitrary icons, each of which, if selected, would lead 
to a second corresponding SELECT screen (Figure 5). The subsequent SELECT screen(s) would 
appear exactly as seen in Experiment 2a, presenting either three, six, or nine task icons, 
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depending on which choice condition (LC, IC, or EC) was chosen on the first SELECT screen. 
Unlike Experiment 2a, in which monkeys were only exposed to a single choice condition on a 
given day, because monkeys were given the freedom to choose the choice condition in 
Experiment 2b, they might have seen one, two, or all three choice conditions (task selection 
screens) on any given day.  
After selecting an array size from which subsequently to choose a specific task, the 
monkey was then able to choose the task itself (CHASE, DEFLECT, or MAZE) as they did in 
Experiment 2a. If they chose the LC array size, there was one icon for each task. If they chose 
the IC array size, there were two icons of each task, and choice of the EC array size led to 3 
Figure 5. Condition Selection and Task Selection screens. Monkeys must manipulate their 
joystick in order to select their preferred choice condition (LC, IC, or EC). This selection will 
lead the monkey to the corresponding task selection screen with either three (LC), six (IC), or 
nine (EC) task options. They must then navigate the cursor to the task of their choosing, and 
complete the task to receive their pellet reward.  
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icons of each task being available to choose from. Monkeys then chose one task icon. After the 
monkey completed a single trial of the selected task, the program returned to the Condition 
SELECT screen and monkeys had a new opportunity to choose the choice condition (i.e., the 
number of task icons) and, subsequently, the task. 
5 EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS 
5.1 Experiment 2a: Investigating choice overload in monkeys 
In this experiment, I looked for evidence of choice overload effects in rhesus macaques 
and capuchin monkeys by measuring the monkeys’ latency to select a task, the proportion of 
trials in which they switched tasks, their task performance (i.e., the time it took for the monkeys 
to complete the task), and their dropout rate (i.e., the proportion of trials in which they “gave up” 
on a game after selecting it), when presenting them with either three (LC), six (IC), or nine (EC) 
task options. After data collection was complete, I found that dropouts were very rare or 
nonexistent, occurring only between 0-2% of the time for any monkey in a given condition. For 
this reason, dropout rates were not included in subsequent analyses. Analyses described below 
were carried out in SPSS. Data initially were analyzed as a function of species, but no effects of 
that factor were found. In addition, species was not a variable of interest for this study, and so I 
collapsed across species for all subsequent analyses.  
Latency-to-choose data were found to be non-normally distributed. Consequently, a non-
parametric Friedman’s test was utilized here. I found that the choice condition (LC, IC, EC) to 
which the monkey was assigned did not significantly affect the time it took them to choose a task 
(X2(2) = 0.46, p = .794; Figure 6). Unlike in Experiment 1 with children, where participants only 
partook in up to six trials, monkeys were able to engage in hundreds of trials in each condition. 
Therefore, I was able to analyze monkeys’ global rate of switching in each condition rather than 
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on a trial-by-trial basis as I had for the children. Like monkeys’ latency-to-choose data, the 
switching data were non-normally distributed, and a non-parametric Friedman’s test was utilized 
for analysis. Consistent with the latency-to-choose result, choice condition did not have a 
significant effect on overall task switching (X2(2) = 3.80, p = .149; Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 6. The average time it took monkeys to select a task in each 
choice condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  





Figure 7. Monkeys’ overall proportion of task switching as a function of 
choice condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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The data on latency to complete tasks were found to be normally distributed and did not 
violate the assumption of sphericity. Therefore, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was used 
to investigate the effect of choice condition on latency to complete the tasks. The choice 
conditions (LC, IC, EC) did not significantly affect the time it took monkeys to complete the 
tasks (F(2, 24) = 1.689, p = .210; Figure 8). 
In short, of the three measures analyzed here, I did not find any evidence to support the 
hypothesis that monkeys would experience choice overload at larger arrays: the monkeys did not 
demonstrate any significant differences in latency to choose a task, latency to complete a task, or 
propensity to switch from one task to another in back-to-back trials based on the choice 
condition (LC, IC, or EC) to which they were assigned in each test session. Although it is 
possible that these results indicate that monkeys, unlike humans, are not prone to the effects of 
choice overload, I speculate that monkeys likely do experience choice overload in some 
instances, but our design was not sensitive enough to find these effects. 
 
Figure 8. The average time it took monkeys to complete tasks in each 
condition (“task performance”). Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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5.2 Experiment 2b: Investigating choice condition preference in monkeys 
In this experiment, monkeys were able to choose their choice condition (LC, IC, or EC) 
instead of the choice condition being assigned to them, as they were in Experiment 2a. I 
hypothesized that monkeys, like adult humans, would exhibit a preference for larger arrays (the 
EC condition) over smaller arrays (the LC and IC conditions). I analyzed the relative proportions 
each condition was chosen out of 600 trials2. The proportion data were found to be non-normally 
distributed. I first conducted a non-parametric Friedman’s ANOVA and found there was a 
significant difference in the proportions the choice icons were chosen (X2 = 18.39, p <.001). A 
post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank was conducted with a Bonferroni correction 
applied, resulting in a significance level set at p < .016. The results indicated that the proportion 
of LC and IC choices were not significantly different (Z = -1.71, p = .087). However, monkeys 
did choose the EC condition significantly more than the LC condition (39.4% compared to 
28.0% of the time, respectively; Z = -3.18; p = .001) and the IC condition (39.4% to 32.6%; Z = -
2.98, p = .003). These results corresponded with my hypothesis that monkeys would demonstrate 
a greater preference for the EC condition over the other two conditions. 
Additionally, using three Sign tests, I explored whether the proportion each of the 
condition icons was chosen significantly differed from what the null hypothesis would predict 
(chance level of 33%). The Sign tests revealed that the LC and IC conditions were not chosen at 
proportions significantly different than chance (LC: p = .092; IC: p = .581). The proportion at 
which the monkeys chose the EC condition was determined to be significantly greater than 
chance (p < .001). 
 
2 Two female capuchin monkeys did not complete all 600 trials. However, they each completed at least 300 
trials. Because the analyses were run on proportion data, I included these monkeys’ data even though they had fewer 
than 600 trials.   
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I also conducted a Chi square test on each individual monkeys’ proportion of choices 
using VassarStats.net. Five of the 13 monkeys exhibited a significant preference for the EC 
option.  Five monkeys showed a significant bias against the LC or IC options (Table 6). 
Table 6. Results of Chi square tests. Monkeys who completed all 600 trials had an expected raw 
count of 200 in each cell should the null hypothesis not be rejected. Expected raw counts for 
monkeys who did not complete all 600 trials (Gretel and Lychee) were calculated by dividing 
their total trial count by three. Cell values that fell outside of the expected distribution range are 
signified with an asterisk. Monkey species is indicated by cap (capuchin) or mac (rhesus 
macaque). 
Monkey Species 
LC raw count 
(stand. resid.) 
IC raw count 
(stand. resid.) 







Gambit Cap 78 (-8.63)* 261 (4.31)* 261 (4.31)* 200 111.63 <.001 
Griffin Cap 172 (-1.98)* 186 (-0.99) 242 (2.97)* 200 13.72 .0001 
Gretel Cap 87 (-1.58) 102 (-0.10) 120 (1.68) 103 5.30 .070 
Ingrid Cap 179 (-1.48) 205 (0.35) 216 (1.13) 200 3.61 .164 
Irene Cap 202 (.014) 178 (-1.56) 220 (1.41) 200 4.44 .108 
Lily Cap 150 (-3.54)* 202 (0.14) 248 (3.39)* 200 24.04 <.001 
Logan Cap 181 (-1.34) 188 (-0.85) 231 (2.19)* 200 7.33 .025 
Lychee Cap 160 (0.54) 146 (-0.59) 154 (0.05) 153.33 .64 .726 
Wren Cap 209 (0.64) 171 (-2.05)* 220 (1.41) 200 6.61 .036 
Chewie Mac 204 (0.28) 187 (-0.92) 209 (0.64) 200 1.33 .514 
Han Mac 177 (-1.63) 197 (-0.21) 226 (1.84) 200 6.07 .048 
Murph Mac 183 (-1.2) 202 (0.14) 215 (1.06) 200 2.59 .273 
Obi Mac 77 (-8.70)* 158 (-2.97)* 365 (11.67)* 200 220.59 <.001 
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6 DISCUSSION 
The aim for this study was to determine whether and to what degree very young children 
and nonhuman primates exhibit the paradox of choice effect: an attraction to larger arrays over 
smaller arrays but experiencing negative consequences when choosing from larger arrays. I 
hypothesized that children and monkeys would fall prey to the paradox of choice, such that they 
would experience more negative consequences in the extensive choice (EC) condition relative to 
the intermediate choice (IC) condition and the limited choice (LC) condition but would also 
exhibit a strong preference for choosing from the EC condition.  
To explore the presence of this phenomenon in these populations, I first investigated 
whether children and monkeys would experience choice overload, the negative consequences 
associated with too many options (Experiments 1a and 2a, respectively). Then I wished to 
establish whether children and monkeys would demonstrate a preference for the larger arrays, 
even after potentially exhibiting negative consequences from choosing among arrays of that size 
(Experiments 1b and 2b). However, the COVID-19 pandemic caused testing to be cut short with 
children, leading me to collect fewer trials than anticipated in Experiment 1a and unable to 
conduct Experiment 1b.  
  Despite this setback, the results of Experiment 1a provide some evidence that children 
experienced choice overload at the IC and EC conditions, such that children exhibited 
approximately twice the odds of switching (i.e., exchanging a selected toy for a different prize) 
in the IC and EC condition as they were to switch in the LC condition. These results were not 
found to be statistically significant at p < .05, but the results had a large effect size, were trending 
in the expected direction, and may have reached statistical significance had I completed the study 
as expected and had greater power. If I were to interpret these results as being true evidence of 
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choice overload, it would be interesting to note that children exhibit choice overload in the IC 
condition (when choosing among six toys) nearly to the same degree as they seem to exhibit 
choice overload in the EC condition, because six alternatives is often used at the limited choice 
condition in experiments with adult humans. If this is a real effect, it is possible that young 
children may experience choice overload at six alternatives when adults do not because of 
children’s more limited working memory and cognitive control compared to adults (Alloway et 
al., 2006; Gathercole et al., 2004); but more research would need to be conducted to answer this 
question. Additionally, future research may want to manipulate the time children are given to 
play with the toy before they must make the decision to switch. The longer the child interacts 
with the toy, the more susceptible they may be to the endowment effect (a tendency to value an 
object more than it is really worth simply because you feel a sense of ownership for the object; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980) and the less likely they may be to switch. 
Children also took significantly longer to make a choice in the EC condition than in 
either of the other two conditions. It is possible that this was a sign of choice overload; that is, 
that this latency was a reflection of a more difficult decision-making process in the EC condition 
compared to the other conditions. However, it is also well within the realm of possibilities that 
this effect can be entirely explained by scanning time. The EC condition, by its nature, had more 
options for the children to visually investigate, and therefore took longer for the child to inspect 
each toy one by one. I had argued in the introduction that if the results revealed that children 
exhibited disproportionately longer latency to choose a toy in the EC condition than in other 
conditions, this may be interpreted as choice overload; however, that is not the case here, and 
accordingly, I am not interpreting the latency-to-choose data as evidence of choice overload in 
children. However, it is interesting to note that the relationship between latency to make a choice 
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and choice set size seems more exponential in nature than linear; at least, there was a qualitative 
jump in the time it took to make a choice between the IC and EC condition that seemed to reflect 
something more than a linear increase in looking time.  
Finally, I analyzed children’s satisfaction data in each choice condition. I hypothesized 
that children would exhibit decreased satisfaction in the EC condition compared to the other two 
condition, a consequence typical of choice overload. The results trended in this direction: 
children reported lower satisfaction scores in the EC and IC condition compared to the LC 
condition, although this difference was only significant for the IC-LC comparison. However, 
previous research had indicated that Likert scales are an unreliable tool for measuring children’s 
happiness (Mellor & Moore, 2013). We found this to be true in our own study as well: There was 
little variability in satisfaction rating between children or conditions, such that children almost 
always chose the largest smiley face. In fact, the largest smiley was chosen 176 times in total, 
whereas the four other smileys were chosen for a combined total of 35 times. Furthermore, 
anecdotally we observed that some children declared in the first or second trial that they were 
always going to choose the largest smiley in the subsequent trials, and some children chose the 
largest smiley even when they verbally expressed dissatisfaction during the trial. In cases that 
children did vary from the largest-smiley response, children often gave explanations for this 
decision that were unrelated to their satisfaction with their toy selection (i.e., because the smiley 
was cute, because the smiley represented them (the child) and the other smileys represented their 
family members, etc.). For these reasons, I considered these satisfaction rating analyses to be 
secondary to the latency-to-choose and switching analyses. 
Because there was little variability in the rating data and because children often gave 
reasons unrelated to their satisfaction for making their rating-score decisions, I hesitate to draw 
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any conclusions from these results at this point in time. Replication of these results or a more 
reliable means of testing children’s satisfaction scores would enable me to say with greater 
confidence how choice condition affects children’s satisfaction. 
The data did not reveal any evidence of choice overload for the monkeys. Despite 
collecting multiple measures to assess possible choice overload effects, it seemed that choice 
condition did not significantly impact the monkeys on any of these measures. It is possible that 
this evidence reflects that monkeys do not experience choice overload at all. Choice overload 
may be a human-unique phenomenon driven by cultural influences, especially in WEIRD 
(Western, educated, industrialized, rich, developed; Henrich et al., 2010) societies. The virtually 
limitless options granted by the internet and international trade, coupled with the Western value 
of personal freedom, may have influenced WEIRD humans to become “maximizers” at a 
population level, driven to always search for a better option. Alternatively, monkeys, who are not 
exposed to these cultural pressures, may be “satisficers” on the whole, content with ‘good 
enough’ alternatives and therefore less susceptible to choice overload.   
Humans may also be uniquely susceptible to choice overload because of the personal 
accountability they place on their decisions. Scheibehenne and colleagues (2009) demonstrated 
the role that personal accountability plays on choice overload in their study, where participants 
were informed that they could choose to donate to a charity from a group, but that they would 
have justify their choice of charity. Participants who were presented with the smaller (five 
option) assortment were more likely to donate than were participants who were presented with 
the larger (40 option) assortment (Scheibehenne et al., 2009). Without the justification 
manipulation, the opposite was found: individuals were more likely to donate to a charity if they 
chose from the larger array. If personal accountability is a driving factor of choice overload – a 
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     52 
 
sentiment we cannot attribute to nonhuman animals – this may explain why I did not find 
evidence of choice overload in monkeys in my study.  
However, I speculate that monkeys likely do experience choice overload in some 
circumstances, although probably to a lesser degree than do adult humans because of the reasons 
described above. This experiment was the first to test this question, and though it was a valuable 
first attempt at evoking choice overload in monkeys, I believe the methodology was not sensitive 
enough to reveal any real effects even if monkeys are susceptible to choice overload.  
It is important to remember that larger arrays, in and of themselves, do not lead to choice 
overload; rather, it is the presence of moderators that induce choice overload effects at larger 
arrays (Chernev et al., 2015). The primary moderator included in this study was increased choice 
set complexity through the elimination of a dominant option/ideal point. I attempted to control 
for the presence of a dominant option by creating three tasks that monkeys nearly equally 
preferred. Further variability was introduced by creating three difficulty levels within each task. 
So that monkeys would not seek out the EC condition only because it would have a higher 
likelihood of having an easy version of a preferred task, the program concealed the difficulty 
levels of the tasks by only ever displaying one icon for each task, and randomly generating the 
difficulty level after the icon was selected. However, by creating equivalently preferred tasks and 
hiding the difficulty level of the task, it is possible that I took away the experience of choosing 
among six or nine seemingly different alternatives in the IC and EC conditions, respectively, 
despite my best efforts to do otherwise. In other words, monkeys may not have perceived the six 
and nine sets as different from three. Because the icons gave no indication of the difficulty level 
of the task, monkeys likely perceived the set of nine icons as three icons that indicate MAZE of 
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unknown difficulty, three icons that indicate DEFLECT of unknown difficulty, and three icons 
that indicate CHASE of unknown difficulty, rather than nine separate tasks.  
We may consider an analogy using the Iyengar and Lepper (2000) jam experiment. The 
monkeys’ choices icons that provide no indication of the difficulty level of the task would be 
comparable to human subjects choosing among unmarked jams in just three colors, so that there 
are three basic flavors, but then varieties within each flavor that are unknown at the time of 
choice. In this hypothetical experiment, the humans would be able to choose among a few 
different unmarked jams (limited choice condition) or many different unmarked jams (extensive 
choice condition). The participants know some of the jams will be delicious (just as the monkeys 
know sometimes the tasks will be easy) and some jams will be less to their liking (like 
sometimes the tasks will be difficult) but participants will have no way of knowing which jam 
will be which until after they have made a selection. In this case, it is likely that people would 
not experience a strong preference between choosing from many jams or a few, because their 
ability to make a knowledgeable decision that would lead to a desirable outcome is equally 
limited in all scenarios.  
There is another important methodological difference that must be acknowledged 
between most human studies – including the one I conducted with young children – and the 
study conducted with monkeys here: in human studies, the participants are choosing among 
options that are their ultimate prize (i.e., jams or toys), whereas the monkeys in this study are 
choosing among options that were a proxy for their ultimate prize (the pellet). Especially 
considering that these monkeys are experts at completing computer tasks for pellet rewards (and, 
it is worth noting, expertise reportedly decreases one’s susceptibility to choice overload; 
Chernev, 2003; Chernev et al., 2015; Mogilner et al., 2008). Thus, it could have been a 
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consequence of equating task value that there was no reason for a monkey to concern themselves 
over whether they were choosing a MAZE icon from a set of three or a CHASE icon from a set 
of nine; to the monkey, they may all have just represented a mildly enjoyable task icon that took 
some number of seconds to a pellet reward.  Monkeys also had many more chances to make 
selections, so if overload is tied to some level of “regret” over missed options, that may be 
washed out by their ability to choose many times. Of course, there is no way to assess whether 
monkey feel something akin to regret. 
Although the monkeys did not demonstrate evidence of choice overload, some monkeys 
did exhibit the expected preference for larger arrays (EC) over smaller arrays (IC and LC). These 
data were analyzed using a Chi square tests and, although one assumption of Chi square tests is 
that each observation is independent, in this case I treated each monkey as its own population, 
and the observations recorded in this experiment as a sample of this “population.” This is 
consistent with the expanse of literature that informs us that animals prefer having choices. 
Because my experiment did not appear to evoke any negative consequences when faced with 
larger arrays, it is unsurprising that monkeys demonstrated a preference for more alternatives.    
This study was the first to attempt to evoke choice overload in monkeys, and future 
studies may want to examine presenting approximately equivalent options that still allow for 
meaningfully distinct options as choices. One consideration is to present the same task but with 
each option within that task presenting slightly different aesthetic appearances, such as the shape 
of the cursor or the target, or to create nine (or more) completely distinct tasks or other such 
choice alternatives with visually distinct icons to create distinct and meaningful choices in each 
condition. Another future direction may include providing options that are not food-related, such 
as social scenarios or enrichment items, or testing monkeys and adult humans on an equitable 
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task and comparing results. In short, more research is necessary before any conclusions can be 
drawn about monkeys’ susceptibility (or lack of susceptibility) to the paradox of choice 
phenomenon.  
In summary, I found tentative evidence that young children, at least, may experience 
choice overload when a clearly preferred choice is not available to them. I did not find evidence 
that monkeys experienced choice overload, although I cannot say whether this is because 
monkeys are immune to choice overload or whether the design of this study failed to evoke the 
negative consequences of too many options. The goal for this study was to answer the question 
“Is the paradox of choice a phenomenon shared with other species?” Unfortunately, the results 
did not provide a definitive answer. However, I believe that this study sets the stage for future 
research on this topic by demonstrating the necessity of using choice alternatives that are, 
themselves, the reward (rather than proxies for reward), and which are not so similar to one 
another that the perception of choice is eliminated altogether when testing nonhuman primates.  
 
  
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     56 
 
REFERENCES 
Addessi, E., Mancini, A., Crescimbene, L., Ariely, D., & Visalberghi, E. (2010). How to spend a 
token? Trade-offs between food variety and food preference in tufted capuchin monkeys 
(Cebus apella). Behavioural Processes, 83, 267–275. 
Alloway, T. P., Gathercole, S. E., & Pickering, S. J. (2006). Verbal and visuospatial short-term 
and working memory in children: Are they separable? Child Development, 77, 1698–1716.  
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and 
nondepressed students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
108, 441–485. 
Batsching, S., Wolf, R., & Heisenberg, M. (2016). Inescapable stress changes walking behavior 
in flies—Learned helplessness revisited. PLoS ONE, 11, 1–16.  
Beran, M., Klein, E., Evans, T., Antworth, R., & Chan, B. (2007). Perceived control, motivation, 
and task performance in capuchin monkeys. In P. R. Zelick (Ed.), Issues in the psychology 
of motivation (pp. 173–187). Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 
Bown, N. J., Read, D., & Summers, B. (2003). The lure of choice. Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 16, 297–308.  
Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. (2012). Fairness in animals: Where to from here? Social Justice 
Research, 25, 336–351. 
Cannon, D. R. (1999). Cause or control? The temporal dimension in failure sense-making. The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 35, 416–438. 
Catania, A. C. (1980). Freedom of choice: A behavioral analysis. Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation, 14, 97–145. 
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     57 
 
Catania, C., & Sagvolden, T. (1980). Preference for free choice over forced choice in pigeons. 
Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 34, 77–86. 
Chernev, A. (2003). When more is less and less is more: The role of ideal point availability and 
assortment in consumer choice. Journal of Consumer Research, 30, 170–183.  
Chernev, A. (2005). Feature complementarity and assortment in choice. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 31, 748–759.  
Chernev, A. (2006). Decision focus and consumer choice among assortments. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 33, 50–59. 
Chernev, A., Böckenholt, U., & Goodman, J. (2015). Choice overload: A conceptual review and 
meta-analysis. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 25, 333–358.  
Chernev, A., & Hamilton, R. (2009). Assortment size and option attractiveness in consumer 
choice among retailers. Journal of Marketing Research, 46, 410–420.  
Coldwell, S. E., Oswald, T. K., & Reed, D. R. (2009). A marker of growth differs between 
adolescents with high versus low sugar preference. Physiology & Behavior, 96, 574–580. 
Dar-Nimrod, I., Rawn, C. D. Lehman, D. R., & Schwartz, B. (2009). The maximization paradox: 
The costs of seeking alternatives. Personality & Individual Differences, 46, 631–635.  
Deci, E., & Ryan, R. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. 
Plenum Press. 
Desor, J. A., & Beauchamp, G. K. (1987). Longitudinal changes in sweet preferences in humans. 
Physiology & Behavior, 39, 639–641. 
Dhar, R. (1997). Consumer preference for a no-choice option. Journal of Consumer Research, 
24, 215–231.  
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     58 
 
Dhar, R., & Nowlis, S. M. (1999). The effect of time pressure on consumer choice deferral. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 369–384. 
Diehl, K., & Poynor, C. (2010). Great expectations?! Assortment size, expectations, and 
satisfaction. Journal of Marketing Research, 47, 312–322.  
Dru, D., Walker, J. P., & Walker, J. B. (1975). Self-produced locomotion restores visual capacity 
after striate lesions. Science, 187, 265–266. 
Faircloth, K. P. (1974). The importance of subject control in reinforcing brain stimulation. 
Learning & Motivation, 5, 16–23. 
Fasolo, B., McClelland, G., & Todd, P. (2007). Escaping the tyranny of choice: When fewer 
attributes make choice easier. Marketing Theory, 7, 13–26. 
Fenton-O’Creevy, M., Nicholson, N., Soane, E., & Willman, P. (2003). Trading on illusions: 
Unrealistic perceptions of control and trading performance. Journal of Occupational and 
Organizational Psychology, 76, 53–68. 
Furlong, E. F., & Opfer, J. E. (2007). Why is the parietal cortex involved in economic decision-
making? Insights from human and non-human primates. Paper presented at the Society for 
Neuroeconomics, Hull, MA. 
Furlong, E. F., & Opfer, J. E. (2009). Cognitive constraints on how economic rewards affect 
cooperation. Psychological Science, 20, 11–16.  
Furlong, E., & Santos, L. (2014). Evolutionary insights into the nature of choice: Evidence from 
nonhuman primates. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology: Vol. 4: Free will 
and moral responsibility (pp. 347–360). MIT Press. 
Gathercole, S. E., Pickering, S. J., Ambridge, B., & Wearing, H. (2004). The structure of 
working memory from 4 to 15 years of age. Developmental Psychology, 40, 177–190. 
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     59 
 
Goodie, A. S. (2005). The role of perceived control and overconfidence in pathological 
gambling. Journal of Gambling Studies, 76, 481–502. 
Gourville, J., & Soman, D. (2005). Overchoice and assortment type: When and why variety 
backfires. Market Science, 24, 382–395. 
Greenberger, D. B., Strasser, S., Cummings, L. L., & Dunham, R. B. (1989). The impact of 
personal control on performance and satisfaction. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 43, 29–51.  
Haynes, H. (2009). Testing the boundaries of the choice overload phenomenon: The effect of 
number of options and time pressure on decision difficulty and satisfaction. Psychology & 
Marketing, 26, 204–212. 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61–83.  
Hutchinson, J. (2005). Is more choice always desirable? Evidence and arguments from leks, food 
selection, and environmental enrichment. Biological Review, 80, 73–92. 
Inbar, Y., Botti, S., & Hanko, K. (2011). Decision speed and choice regret: When haste feels like 
waste. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 533–540.  
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000). When choice is demotivating: Can one desire too much 
of a good thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 995–1006.  
Jacoby, J., Speller, D. E., & Kohn, C. A. (1974). Brand choice behavior as a function of 
information overload. Journal of Marketing Research, 11, 63–69. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47, 263-291.  
 
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     60 
 
Klerman, G. L., Lavori, P. W., Rice, J., Reich, T., Endicott, J., Andreasen, N. C., … Hirschfeld, 
R. M. A. (1985). Birth cohort trends in rates of major depressive disorder among relatives 
of patients with affective disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 42, 689–693. 
Kurtycz, L. M. (2015). Choice and control for animals in captivity. The Psychologist, 28, 892–
894. 
Langer, E. J., & Rodin, J. (1976). The effects of choice and enhanced personal responsibility for 
the aged: A field experiment in an institutional setting. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 34, 191–198.  
Leotti, L. A., Iyengar, S. S., & Ochsner, K. N. (2010). Born to choose: The origins and value of 
the need for control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 457–463.  
Lewinsohn, P. M., Mischel, W., Chaplin, W., & Barton, R. (1980). Social competence and 
depression: The role of illusory self-perceptions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 89, 203–
212. 
Lin, C., & Wu, P. (2006). The effect of variety on consumer preferences: The role of Need for 
Cognition and recommended alternatives. Social Behavior & Personality: An International 
Journal, 34, 865–875. 
Mellor, D., & Moore, K. A. (2014). The use of Likert scales with children. Journal of Pediatric 
Psychology, 39, 369–379.  
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity 
for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81–97.  
Misuraca, R., Teuscher, U., & Faraci, P. (2016). Is more choice always worse? Age differences 
in the overchoice effect. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 28, 242–255. 
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     61 
 
Mogilner, C., Rudnick, T., & Iyengar, S. S. (2008). The mere categorization effect: How the 
presence of categories increases choosers’ perceptions of assortment variety and outcome 
satisfaction. Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 202–215.  
Payne, J., Bettman, J., & Johnson, E. (1993). The adaptive decision maker: Effort and accuracy 
in choice. In R. M. Hogarth (Ed.), Insights in decision making: A tribute to Hillel J. Einhorn 
(pp. 129–153). The University of Chicago Press. 
Payne, J. W., & Bettman, J. R. (1992). Behavioral decision research: A constructive processing 
perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 87-131.  
Perdue, B., & Brown, E. (2018). Irrational choice behavior in human and non-human primates. 
Animal Cognition, 21, 227–234. 
Perdue, B. M., Evans, T. A., Washburn, D. A., Rumbaugh, D. M., & Beran, M. J. (2014). Do 
monkeys choose to choose? Learning & Behavior, 42, 164–175.  
Perlmuter, L. C., & Monty, R. A. (1977). The importance of perceived control: Fact or fantasy? 
Experiments with both humans and animals indicate that the mere illusion of control 
significantly improves performance in a variety of situations. American Scientist, 65, 759–
765.  
Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. (1987). Explanatory style and illness. Journal of Personality, 55, 
237–265. 
Raps, C. S., Peterson, C., Jonas, M., & Seligman, M. E. (1982). Patient behavior in hospitals: 
Helplessness, reactance, or both? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 1036–
1041.  
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     62 
 
Reed, D. D., DiGennaro Reed, F. D., Chok, J., & Brozyna, G. A. (2011). The “tyranny of 
choice”: Choice overload as a possible instance of effort discounting. The Psychological 
Record, 61, 547–560. 
Reid, D. W., Haas, G., & Hawkings, D. (1977). Locus of desired control and positive self-
concept of the elderly. Journal of Gerontology, 32, 441–450. 
Robins, L. N., Helzer, J. E., Weissman, M. M., Orvaschel, H., Gruenberg, E., Burke, J. D., & 
Regier, D. A. (1984). Lifetime prevalence of specific psychiatric disorders in three sites. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 41, 949–958. 
Rumbaugh, D. M., Richardson, W. K., Washburn, D. A., Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S., & Hopkins, 
W. D. (1989). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), video tasks, and implications for 
stimulus-response spatial contiguity. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 103, 32–38. 
Sagi, A., & Friedland, N. (2007). The cost of richness: The effect of the size and diversity of 
decision sets on post-decision regret. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 
515–524.  
Scheibehenne, B., Greifeneder, R., & Todd, P. M. (2009). What moderates the too-much-choice 
effect? Psychology & Marketing, 26, 229–253.  
Scheibehenne, B., Greifeneder, R., & Todd, P. M. (2010). Can there ever be too many options? 
A meta-analytic review of choice overload. Journal of Consumer Research, 37, 409–425.  
Schill, R., & Marcus, D. (1998). Incarceration and learned helplessness. International Journal of 
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 42, 224–232. 
Schwartz, B. (2000). Self-determination: The tyranny of freedom. American Psychologist, 55, 
79–88.  
Schwartz, B. (2004). The paradox of choice: Why more is less. HarperCollins Publishers. 
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     63 
 
Schwartz, B, Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S., White, K., & Lehman, D. R. (2002). 
Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of choice. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 83, 1178–1197. 
Seligman, M., & Maier, S. (1967). Failure to escape traumatic shock. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 74, 1-9. 
Shapiro, D. H., Schwartz, C. E., & Astin, J. A. (1996). Controlling ourselves, controlling our 
world: Psychology’s role in understanding positive and negative consequences of seeking 
and gaining control. American Psychologist, 51, 1213–1230. 
Shin, J., & Ariely, D. (2004). Keeping doors open: The effect of unavailability on incentives to 
keep options viable. Management Science, 50, 575–586. 
Singh, D. (1970). Preference for bar pressing to obtain reward over freeloading in rats and 
children. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 73, 320–327. 
Suzuki, S. (1999). Selection of forced- and free-choice by monkeys (Macaca fascicularis). 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 88, 242–250. 
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 1, 39–60.  
Voss, S., & Homzie, M. J. (1970). Choice as a value. Psychological Reports, 26, 912–914. 
Walter, J. M., & Soliah, L. A. (1995). Sweetener preference among non-institutionalized older 
adults. Journal of Nutrition for the Elderly, 14, 1–13. 
Washburn, D. A. (1992). Analyzing the path of responding in maze-solving and other tasks. 
Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 24, 248–252. 
Washburn, D. (2015). The four Cs of psychological wellbeing: Lessons from three decades of 
computer-based environmental enrichment. Animal Behavior and Cognition, 2, 218–232.  
PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     64 
 
Washburn, D. A., Hopkins, W. D., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (1989). Video-task assessment of 
learning and memory in macaques (Macaca mulatta): Effects of stimulus movement on 
performance. Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 15, 393–400. 
Washburn, D. A., Hopkins, W. D., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (1990). The effects of competition upon 
video-task performance in monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Journal of Comparative 
Psychology, 104, 115–121. 
Washburn, D A., Hopkins, W. D., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (1991). Perceived control in rhesus 
monkeys (Macaca mulatta): Enhanced video-task performance. Animal Behavior 
Processes, 17, 123–129. 
Winocur, G., Moscovitch, M., & Freedman, J. (1987). An investigation of cognitive function in 
relation to psychosocial variables in institutionalized old people. Canadian Journal of 
Psychology, 41, 257–269.  
Zuckerman, M., Porac, J., Lathin, D., Smith, R., & Deci, E. (1978). On the importance of self-
determination for intrinsically-motivated behavior. Personality and Social Psychology 









PARADOX OF CHOICE                                                                                                                                     65 
 
APPENDICES  
Appendix A: Instructions and Script for Experiment 1a 
1. Before bringing the child into the room, or while they are not looking, use the child’s 
sheet to determine which toys (balls, animals, or cars) they will be using, how many, and 
which colors/animals should not be included. Put the toys into an opaque bin so they do 
not see the toy options before testing begins 
2. Bring the child outside the classroom to pick their toys.  
3. Say the following: 
 
I am about to show you some toys. You will get to choose one of these toys to take 
home today as your prize for doing such a good job. However, today there is a 
special rule when you pick out your prize: you can’t touch any of the toys until 
you are sure which one you would like to take home. You can look at the toys for 
as long as you want, but as soon as you touch one, that is the one you will have to 
take home. Do you understand this rule? 
 
4. Dump the toys out and immediately begin timing the child. You can arrange some of 
them if they are jumbled or on top of each other, but if the child touches a toy, that is 
their selection for the day. 
5. As soon as the child touches a toy, stop the timer, and announce that they’ve made their 
selection. (record the time on the data sheet) 
6. Put the rest of the toys back into the opaque bin. 
7. Tell the child you need to do some paperwork really quickly, and encourage them to play 
with their toy while they wait. Pretend to busy yourself (or fill out the data sheet) while 
the child plays with the toy for 60 seconds.  
8. Ask the child: 
 
Would you like to exchange your toy? If you want, you can put this toy back and 
choose again from the same options that you just saw. Would you like to do that 
today, or do you want to keep the toy you already chose? 
 
9. If they don’t want to exchange, ask them how satisfied they are with the toy they chose 
(see number 11)  
10.   If they say they would like to exchange, put their first choice toy back into the bin and 
dump them out again. You do not need to time the child during this time, but the no-
touching rule still applies.  
11. Once a final selection has been made, ask them how happy they are with the toy they 
chose using the script below and showing them the satisfaction scale. Score it on data 
sheet as 1-5 (1 = smallest smiley, 5 = biggest smiley). 
 
How happy are you with the toy you chose today? Point to the face that shows 
how happy you are – the bigger the face means the happier you are. There are 
no wrong answers, and you’ll get to keep your prize no matter what. 
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Appendix B: Favorites Questionnaire 
What is your favorite color? 
What is your second favorite color? 
What is your favorite animal? 
What is your second favorite animal? 
What is your favorite toy? 
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Appendix C: Smiley Face Likert Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
